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BOOK REVIEWS
THE RATIONAL BASIS OF CONTRACTS AND RELATED PROBLEMS IN LEGAL
ANALYSIS. By Merton L. Ferson. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc.,
1949. Pp. i-ix, 1-330. $4.00
In 291 pages of text Dean Ferson has given us twelve delightfully written
essays devoted to theoretical analysis of most of the problems and practical
application of most of the doctrine covered in the conventional course in
contracts. It will make an excellent companion volume for a casebook and
it does not attempt to replace a detailed treatise. Although it is addressed
particularly to law students to whom it will give a sense of perspective and
continuity, teachers and practitioners will find it easy but stimulating reading.
Chapters 1-4, inclusive, 7, 9 and 11, are reprinted from earlier publications
of Dean Ferson in the Cornell Law Review. Chapter 8, "The Rule in Foakes
v. Beer," is reprinted from his well known article in 31 Yale Law Journal,
and Chapter 12, "Agency to Make Representations," previously appeared
in the Vanderbilt Law Review. To complete the book and give it unity he
has added chapters on "Death of Offeror Pending Acceptance," "The Evolu-
tion of Simple Contracts," and "Voidable Contracts." The volume does not
purport to be a hornbook or even a substitute for one but absence of detailed
factual statement and voluminous citations is decidedly refreshing. In objec-
tive and tone it reminds me more of Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence.
Dean Ferson attempts to do two things: (1) to reduce a number of
everyday commercial transactions, beginning with gifts and progressing
through exchanges, unilateral and bilateral contracts, the creation of powers,
etc., to simple terms and common denominators; (2) by noting the elements
of similarity to arrive at conclusions about controverted legal problems that
are both practical and consistent. In both attempts he is persuasive and I think,
successful. One illustration (there are others) will suffice. Dean Ferson does
not like the rule stemming from Foakes v. Beer, "that payment by the debtor
of a less sum than the whole amount of the debt will not extinguish the. debt,
although the creditor expressly agree to receive it in full and give a receipt
or writing to that effect. . .'." Dislike for the rule is shared by many practical
businessmen and most teachers of contracts. But unlike many who accepted
at face value the court's reason fok the rule ("it rests mainly upon a want
of consideration for the promise [of discharge] given") and then sought to
get around it either by exception, enlarged definition of consideration or a
frontal attack on the entire consideration doctrine, Dean Ferson concentrated
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his fire on the reason. The groundwork is laid in the very first chapter in
his analysis of gifts where the non-contractual nature of the transaction is
obvious. The transition to exchanges is simple and readily understandable.
"But exchanges do not create obligation and therefore are not contracts"
(p. 21). Ferson concludes that cases like Foakes v. Beer really involve not
contract but exchange (payment of a sum of money for a chose in action)
and that, therefore, they should be at least "spared from the consideration
requirement." I found both the argument and its presentation charmingly
persuasive.
Other questions, troublesome particularly to beginning students, crossed
offers (pp. 90-99), effect of offeror's death on an outstanding offer (c. 5),
formation of bilateral contracts concluded by correspondence (pp. 135-42),
rights of third party beneficiaries (pp. 143-52), receive careful analysis and
suggested solutions. The chapter on "Voidable Contracts" treats a number of
commonly recurring problems, infant's contracts, fraud in the inducement,
subsequent promises after the statute of limitations has run and after discharge
in bankruptcy. There are concepts here basic in the commercial field, and
having common features whether encountered in the course in contracts,
sales, or debtor's estates. The basic course in consensual relations is the proper
place to see them in perspective and the book will aid materially in doing it.
The acid test of a book like this is whether it can achieve simplicity and
symmetry without resultant generalizations that are at best useless and at
worst misleading and dangerous. Dean Ferson's treatment happily achieves
the former. Throughout the book there is a good bit of legal history and
much philosophy and jurisprudence. The latter is made more than ordinarily
palatable for first year students by a simplicity of style and language (an
outstanding characteristic of the book) and a context of extreme practicality.
While the basic distinctions between promise and condition are made,
I regret that there is no essay dealing intensively with problems traditionally
covered under the heading of performance and breach of contract. The
omission does not mar an excellent book, for everything could not be included.
It does, however, make me hope that Dean Ferson will some time deal with
these problems as effectively as he has with the others.
HAROLD SHEPHERD
BEUTEL'S 'BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. By Frederick K.
Beutel. Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Company. Seventh Edition,
1948. Pp. xiii, 1628. $15.00.
This is the reappearance of an old friend. It is the seventh edition of the
volume originally prepared by Professor Joseph Doddridge Brannan, and
. * Dean, Duke University School of Law; editor, CAsEs ON' CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1946).
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could have been labeled just that; but Dean Beutel has made such extensive
contributions that the new name is not out of order. This book is an annotated
statute, and in view of the fact that it has been adopted in fifty-four juris-
dictions 1 it is probably entitled to first place in the realm of statutory
annotations. The original volume was a notable contribution, and there have
since appeared two revisions by Brannan himself, one by Professor Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., and this is the third by Dean Beutel.
Seven editions in forty years proclaim the widespread demand for this
compilation of authorities under the Negotiable Instruments Law. The
growth of the book is significant. Omitting preliminary pages in Roman
numerals the volumes have grown as follows: 250 pages in the first edition
in 1908, 330 in the second in 1911, 622 In the third in 1919, 1041 in the fourth
in 1926, 1322 in the fifth in 1932, 1442 in the sixth in 1938, and 1628 in
the seventh in 1948.
The original effort to include every case decided under the Act has
long since been abandoned in favor of a plan of selective annotations. This
is desirable because the subject would be smothered if every case which
merely cited the Act, or restated the language therein, had to be included.
There have been other omissions, however, to make room for new material
and keep the work within the limits of a single volume; aid some of these
deletions have been unfortunate. The enlightening Ames-Brewster-1McKeehan
discussion of the Act, which had been carried through three editions, was
omitted from the fourth. And the English cases contained in all former
editions have been omitted from the seventh. What has been added is more
important than what has been left out, but it is a matter of regret that there
was not room for those two useful items.
Part One of the book has two sections. The first covers the history and
interpretation of the law of negotiable instruments, while the second sets out
the text of the uniform statute and the Commissioner's Notes, with exten-
sive cross references from one section to another. Part Two is the annotated
statute, and Part Three is made up of various tables and lists.
The most important addition has been the inclusion of outstanding
decisions handed down since 1938, but the most obvious change is the appear-
ance of a new section in Part One-a brief history of the development of
the law and a discussion of interpretation.2 This is interesting although not
all will agree with everything to be found at this point. Dean Beutel is at
1. Forty-eight states and Alaska, Canal Zone, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Philip-
pine Islands, and Puerto Rico.
2. Dean Beutel had a few pages on interpretation in each of his previous editions.
See pp. 81-86 in the fifth, and 98-106 in the sixth. His section on history and inter-




heart a civilian. 3 He says, ior example, that the basic reason for the doctrine
of stare decisis "ceases to exist as soon as the law is reduced to writing." 4
In his view a case decided under the statute is not law but merely the court's
idea at the moment of what the statute means.5 To the extent that he would
like to substitute civil law technique for that of the common law he is no
doubt doomed to failure, but in the effort to prove his point he has directed
attention to numerous faulty decisions.
6
It is puzzling why one so inclined to belittle the importance of cases
under the Act should have undertaken this task of annotation. However
that may be, he has done an excellent job. This book is a "must" for every
law office.
ROLLIN M. PERKINS*
SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS-No. 1, INHERITANCE OF PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF TESTA-MENTARY DISPOSITION. Edited by Edward
N. Cahn. New York: New York University School of Law, 1948.
Pp. vi, 90. $1.50.
In 1948 a conference was held at New York University to consider the
educational problem of the relation of law to the social sciences. The plan
adopted was to choose annually a specific legal concept and then have, as here,
several specialists from among the various social sciences, each of whom
would "let the light of his learning play upon this fundamental legal concept
of great social concern." (p. vi). The result of this display of pyrotechnics
is a blend of fantasy and frustration.
The "Social Meaning of Legal Concepts" must be taken to connote the
social background that one ought to have in mind when he considers a
specific legal concept. In this first effort, the specific legal concept is the inher-
itance of property and the power of testamentary disposition. Before consid-
ering the findings of the four specialists concerning this concept, it should
be mentioned that a preliminary problem in the social sciences is methodology.
How does the investigator establish the facts of a social science? Prior to
the modern insistence upon testing hypotheses by experience, the spinning
of a priori cobwebs produced the social contract and other curiosities. It might
be thought that these modern scholars would have indicated with some pre-
3. Beutel, The Necessity of a New Technique of Interpreting the N. I. L.-The
Civil Law Analogy, 6 TULANE L. Rav. 1 (1931).
4. Pp. 101-2.
5. He does not state his view as bluntly as this, but it is implicit in his distinction
between "the law itself' and "mere interpretation." P. 102.
6. Pp. 80-109.
* Acting Dean and Frank C. Rand Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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cision their methods in determining.what properly belongs in the social
background of the legal concept under discussion. This they did not do.
The first specialist was an anthropologist. His task was that of comparing
human behaviour in various cultures with respect to this single legal concept.
The result of such investigations should be, as he says, to break down
"parochial myopia." Studies of primitive cultures make it possible to examine
cultural institutions without vestigial veneers intruding. His conclusion is
that the specific forms of succession and testamentary disposition are "influ-
enced and molded by developments in other phases of culture." (p. 26).
An economist, as the second specialist, announced that he would attempt
"an -appraisal in terms of the social consequences of the legal concept or
institution under review." (p. 27). As an economist, however, he had to
point out that his interest in inheritance was "largely concerned with the
effects of inheritance upon the distribution of wealth and income and upon its
production." (pp. 30-31). The most important effect of inheritance is that
it produces and perpetuates inequality, by preventing distribution according
to merit and opportunity. In this sense it may promote social discord or may
seriously affect the incentive to produce. The evaluation of this effect of
inequality upon productiveness in terms of various economic theories is
somewhat vitiated by the confession of the writer that there is little quanti-
tative evidence upon which to base any opinion; and further, what little there
is, indicates that inherited wealth has played only a minor role "in shaping the
American economy and the distribution of its wealth and opportunities."
(p. 47). Moreover, even this minor role is declining in importance due to the
general acceptance of the graduated inheritance tax and the operati6n of the
income tax before the death of the testator. The major reason for the lack
of importance of inheritance among private individuals, so far as the pro-
duction of the economy is concerned, is that the "aggregates of wealth used
for productive purposes are largely the property of corporations." (p. 51).
Transfers among individuals have no effect upon these accumulations, the use
of which is largely determined by corporate managers who do not own the
assets of the corporations.
A sociologist then indicated that his field is concerned with the inter-
relations among the institutions within a culture. The assumption being that
there are always such interrelations, the proposition that comes easily that
"the specialized law of property devolution serves . . . both to reflect social
needs and to resolve them." (p. 56). Our contemporary culture reflects a
shift from the landed estate of feudal society, which must for power's sake
be kept intact to a "money nexus" which today forms the key to all relations
of society and man. This shift made easy the'changeover in the principle
of distribution from primogeniture to equality among the surviving heirs.
This in turn reflects the "democratization of the family and society." Whilt
19491]
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no data are supplied, the writer avers that "The principle of equitable distri-
bution of estates to descendants has played some considerable part in an
inclination of our families to keep their size small enough to insure a fair
patrimony to each." (p. 67). Further, the abolition of primogeniture removed
the ancient duty imposed upon the heir to provide for the dependent of the
family. Actually, the "property system and its devolution cannot be held
responsible, of course, for all this familial disorganization. The difficulty
appears to be rooted more deeply in an urban industrialism which has made
the family a less useful institution." (p. 71).
Both the economist and the sociologist were frank to admit that their
ultimate data were value judgments. It was therefore fitting that a teacher
of ethics had the final word in this discussion. Final is an understatement.
He flatly declares that aside from objects of sentimental value-trophies and
keepsakes--"the inheritance of property which has a controlling influence
on our basic human relations ought to be abolished." (p. 89). In the first
place, most of the "workers" are unaffected by the laws of inheritance
because they fail to accumulate enough either to devise or to bequeath. For
those whose economic status is such as permits the creation of inheritable
estates, the interest in providing for their families after death is based upon
a sound ethical motive of providing for those who need protection. But it
also affords a vent for the ego as expressed by conditions in the will. More-
over, inheritance has a harmful effect upon the legatees by sapping their
incentive to produce. A more desirable standard of social equality suggests
that the state has an obligation to provide for all those who need protection.
This will open the way for removing this unhealthy form of perpetuating
social inequality and stunting individual growth.
Some comment is called for as to the significance of these essays, for if
the above is a fair statement of the views of these four specialists, what now
must an experienced probate lawyer think? Has he devoted his life to an
unethical task of little significance and that little on the decline? There is
presumably no intention that these four statements are to be considered as
a harmony with one another. But even if they are only intended as the
opinions of four experts, because of the absolutist tones and the lack of
empirical basis in the expression of these opinions, the value of making them
becomes questionable, even as an educational gesture to serve as a starting
point of investigation. In the introduction to the booklet, Dean Vanderbilt
of New York University indicates that these views were commented upon
by outstanding judges and lawyers. It is suggested that in the succeeding
efforts of these conferences,°a transcript of these comments be appended to
the original statement. The views of these specialists on the social meaning
of this particular legal concept, if left standing alone, will not have the
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